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Abstract
We have proposed in several recent papers a critical view of some parts
of quantum mechanics (QM) that is methodologically unusual because it
rests on analysing the language of QM by using some elementary but fun-
damental tools of mathematical logic. Our approach proves that some
widespread beliefs about QM can be questioned and establishes new links
with a classical view, which is significant in the debate on the interpreta-
tions of QM. We propose here a brief survey of our results, highlighting
their common background. We firstly show how quantum logic (QL) can
be embedded into classical logic (CL) if the embedding is required to
preserve the logical order and not the algebraic structure, and also how
QL can be interpreted as a pragmatic sublanguage within a pragmatic
extension of CL. Both these results challenge the thesis that CL and QL
formalize the properties of different and incompatible notions of truth. We
then show that quantum probability admits an epistemic interpretation if
contextuality is taken into account as a basic constituent of the language
of QM, which overcomes the interpretation of quantum probability as on-
tic. Finally, we show that the proofs that QM is a contextual theory stand
on a supplementary epistemological assumption that is usually unnoticed
and left implicit. Dropping such assumption opens the way, at least in
principle, to non-contextual interpretations of QM.
Keywords Quantum logic·Quantum pragmatics·Quantum probabil-
ity·Noncontextual·interpretations of quantum mechanics
1 Introduction
After almost one century after the birth of quantum mechanics (QM), the de-
bate on the interpretation of this theory is still alive (see, e.g., Schlosshauer
et al., 2013). At variance with classical mechanics (CM), QM exhibits indeed
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some features that make it hard to construct a consistent picture of the physi-
cal world. In particular, a highly counterintuitive feature of QM is nonlocality,
following (according to the standard interpretation of QM) from the existence
of entangled states, which nevertheless are considered as important resources
in quantum information theory. Based on a critical analysis of the theorems
aiming at proving nonlocality, we proposed in some previous papers (see, e.g.,
Garola, 2015; Garola et al., 2016) a falsifiable generalization of QM that em-
bodies the mathematical formalism of QM but introduces a reinterpretation of
quantum probabilities able to avoid nonlocality. However, we will not insist on
this proposal here, nor consider the numerous interpretations that have been
advanced and their variants. We would rather focus on the results obtained
in some further papers, in which we made a critical analysis of some typical
issues in QM (Garola, 2017; Garola, 2018; Garola and Persano, 2014; Garola
and Sozzo, 2010, 2013). Indeed, those results are significant, in our opinion, if
one wants to choose or to construct an interpretation of QM, for they show that
some widespread beliefs about QM can be questioned.
Let us list the issues that are considered in the papers quoted above.
(i) The contextuality of QM, which implies that the values of the observables
of a physical system do not pre-exist to their measurements. This is a basic no-
tion in the standard interpretation of QM, but a formal proof of it has been given
for the first time by the famous Bell’s (1966) and Kochen-Specker’s (1967) the-
orems. It can be rephrased by saying that the properties of a quantum physical
system are non-objective, in the sense that assuming that they are either pos-
sessed or not possessed by the system independently of any measurement leads
to contradictions.
(ii) The controversial role of (standard, sharp) quantum logic (QL) in QM.
Some authors maintain indeed that QL formalizes a new way of reasoning in-
troduced by QM, as this theory would determine a notion of quantum truth,
different and incompatible with the classical notion of truth (see, e.g., Re´dei,
1958; Dalla Chiara et al., 2004). Other authors uphold instead that QL is just
a part of the mathematical apparatus of QM and has nothing to do with logic
(see, e.g., Aerts, 1999).
(iii) The interpretation of quantum probability, whose mathematical struc-
ture is different from that of classical probability. Indeed, quantum probability
is usually maintained to be non-epistemic, in the sense that it cannot be inter-
preted as expressing a (indirect) measure of our ignorance of values of observ-
ables pre-existing to measurements.
Issue (ii) is discussed in (Garola, 2008; Garola, 2017; Garola and Sozzo, 2014)
and issue (iii) in (Garola, 2018). Both treatments accept the standard view
about non-objectivity of properties. Nevertheless, we obtain some results that
question standard beliefs, as anticipated above. Indeed, when considering QL in
(Garola, 2008; Garola and Sozzo, 2014), we show that it can be embedded into
classical logic (CL) if the embedding is required to preserve the logical order and
not the algebraic structure; moreover, we prove in (Garola, 2017) that QL can
be interpreted as a pragmatic sublanguage within a pragmatic extension of CL.
Both these results challenge the thesis that CL and QL formalize the properties
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of different and incompatible notions of truth. Furthermore, when considering
quantum probability in (Garola, 2018), we show that it admits an epistemic
interpretation if contextuality is taken into account as a basic constituent of the
language of QM, which overcomes the aforesaid non-epistemic interpretation of
quantum probability.
Finally, issue (i) is discussed in (Garola and Sozzo, 2010; Garola and Persano,
2014). Here we show that the proofs that QM is a contextual theory stand on
a supplementary epistemological assumption that is usually unnoticed and left
implicit. Dropping such assumption opens the way, at least in principle, to
non-contextual interpretations of QM, which are usually excluded on the basis
of the conviction that contextuality is “mathematically proven” by Bell’s and
Kochen-Specker’s theorems.
In this paper we present the above arguments in a unified perspective, avoid-
ing technical details but trying to make clear the physical, logical and episte-
mological reasons underlying them. In particular, we aim to show that our pro-
cedures exemplify a somewhat unusual methodology in physics, because they
are based on analysing the language of QM by means of some elementary but
fundamental tools of mathematical logic, which also leads to establish some new
links with classical views. To this end, we anticipate some epistemological and
linguistic preliminaries in Section 2 and then summarize the main lines of our
analysis of the issues listed above in Section 3 (issue (ii)), Section 4 (issue (iii))
and Section 5 (issue (i); in this case our treatment is also refined with respect
to its original presentations), insisting on their common background. We hope
that this presentation may constitute a useful contribution to the debate on the
possible interpretations of QM.
2 Epistemological and linguistic preliminaries
As we have anticipated in Section 1, we recollect and summarize in this section
some notions that are well known to epistemologists (Section 2.1) or to physicists
(Sections 2.2 and 2.3). Our presentation, however, is somewhat original, for it
mainly focuses on the languages of the theories that are considered (CM and
QM), thus constituting a background for our arguments in Sections 3, 4 and 5.
2.1 The received view
According to the standard epistemological conception, or received view (see, e.g.,
Braithwaite, 1953; Nagel, 1961; Hempel, 1965; Carnap, 1966), a fully-developed
physical theory T is in principle expressible by means of a metalanguage in
which a theoretical language LT and an observational language LO can be dis-
tinguished. The theoretical apparatus of T includes a mathematical structure
expressed by means of LT and, usually, an intended interpretation, namely a
direct and complete physical model of the mathematical structure. Such an
interpretation is often anticipated by the choice of the nouns of the theoretical
terms and it is not indispensable in principle, but plays a fundamental role in
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the intuitive comprehension, justification and development of the theory (think,
e.g., to the trajectories of point-like particles in CM or to the interpretation of
electromagnetic fields as waves). The observational language LO, instead, is in-
terpreted via assignment rules on an empirical domain, hence it has a semantic
interpretation. The two languages are connected by correspondence (or epis-
temic) rules RC that establish complex and sometimes problematic relations
between LO and LT (e.g., a self-adjoint operator may represent many different
but physically equivalent measuring devices in QM), so that the correspondence
together with the assignment rules provide an empirical interpretation of the
mathematical structure. This interpretation generally is indirect, in the sense
that there are theoretical entities that are connected with the empirical domain
only via derived theoretical entities, and incomplete, in the sense that only lim-
ited ranges of values of the theoretical entities are interpreted (e.g., self-adjoint
operators correspond in QM to measuring apparatuses whose outcomes match
the eigenvalues of the operators only in finite intervals of the real axis).
The received view was criticized by some authors (see, e.g., Kuhn, 1962; Fey-
erabend, 1975) and is nowadays maintained to be outdated by several scholars.
Nevertheless, we deem that its basic ideas are still epistemologically relevant
and may greatly help to single out the fundamental differences between CM
and QM. In particular, this view led us to focus our attention on the languages
of physical theories, suggesting to explore their similarities and differences by
analysing their syntax and semantics. We review in the following sections sev-
eral results that we have obtained following that suggestion, some of which are
quite unexpected and challenge well established beliefs.
We add that in the standard language of physical theories the distinctions
introduced by the received view are usually overlooked, and the various linguistic
components are mixed together (e.g., the term “observable” may denote in QM
a self-adjoint operator on a Hilbert space H, and in this sense it belongs to LT ,
but also a physical entity associated with a set of measurement procedures, and
in this sense it belongs to LO; the term “state” may denote a vector of H, but
also a physical entity associated with a set of preparing procedures; etc.). Only
a rational reconstruction of the language of a theory can lead to distinguish
clearly the various elements that occur in it according to the received view. We,
however, will not deal with this issue in this paper. It will be indeed sufficient
for our aims to formalize some simple sublanguages of the languages of CM and
QM which exhibit strong similarities and differences.
2.2 The language of classical mechanics
In the standard language of CM the notions of material body and physical quan-
tity play a basic role, both at a theoretical and at an observational level. Accord-
ing to the received view (Section 2.1), the terms “material body” and “physical
quantity” belong to the observational language LO of CM. The former refers to
a set of elements (material bodies) of the empirical domain that are represented
in the theoretical language LT of CM by the elements of an abstract set, still
called material bodies by abuse of language. The latter refers to a set of en-
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tities (physical quantities) of the empirical domain, each of which consists of a
set of (exact) measurement procedures and is represented in LT by a function
that takes values on material bodies, still called physical quantity by abuse of
language; then, every measurement procedure belonging to a physical quantity,
when activated on a material body, performs a measurement whose outcome
yields the value of the physical quantity on the body.
Based on the notions mentioned above, the derived notions of property and
state are introduced. Also the terms “property” and “state”belong to LO. The
former refers to a set of entities (properties) of the empirical domain, each of
which consists of a set of (exact) dichotomic measurement procedures and is
represented in LT by a pair of the form (A,∆), still called property by abuse
of language, where A is a physical quantity and ∆ ∈ B(R) is a Borel set of the
real line (hence the physical quantity A is bijectively associated with the family
{(A,∆)}∆∈B(R) of properties); then, one says that a material body a possesses
the property E represented by (A,∆) if and only if (iff in the following) the
value that A takes on a belongs to ∆, so that every dichotomic measurement
procedure associated, via LO, with E, when activated on a material body a,
performs a measurement whose outcome tells us whether a possesses E. The
latter term refers to a set of entities (states) of the empirical domain, each of
which consists of a set of preparation procedures and is represented in LT by a
set of properties, still called state by abuse of language; then, every preparation
procedure belonging to a state S, when activated, prepares material bodies
sharing the set of properties representing S.
States and properties play a fundamental role in our analysis. Indeed, the
statement that a material body a has been prepared by a preparation procedure
associated with the state S (briefly, “a is in the state S”) can be formalized by
an elementary sentence S(a) of predicate logic. Analogously, a statement of the
form “a possesses the property E” can be formalized by E(a).
The semantic rules assigning truth values to the sentences of LO are now
crucial. Indeed, truth assignments are made in the language of CM according
to the classical theory of truth as correspondence, as reconstructed by Tarski
(1944, 1956). When considering elementary sentences, truth values (true/false)
are assigned by fulfilling Tarski’s truth condition (exemplified by the famous
statement “‘the snow is white’ is true iff the snow is white”). This is apparent
if one refers to the standard geometrical model of the mathematical apparatus,
in which a physical system is represented by a phase space and properties and
states by subsets and points, respectively, of the phase space. Indeed, according
to this model, a property E is possessed by the individual object a in the state
S, that is, the sentence E(a) is true, iff the point representing S belongs to the
subset representing E. This rule, however, is not semantically neutral as such
an assignment implies an assumption of objectivity of properties, which can be
stated as follows.
O. Any property of a material body a is possessed or not possessed by a
independently of any measurement.
Usually, assumption O is not stated explicitly but is implicit in the language
of CM. It implies in particular that the measurement procedures associated with
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E, when performed on the empirical object a, check (or reveal, if unknown) the
truth value of E(a), which does not depend on the procedures themselves and
pre-exists to them: hence, all procedures must yield the same result.
When considering complex sentences that can be formalized by introducing
classical logical connectives as ¬ (not), ∧ (and), ∨ (or), etc., and then connect-
ing elementary sentences of the form E(a) or S(a) by means of these connectives,
Tarski’s theory requires that truth values be assigned by recursive rules such
that the truth value of any complex formula depends only on the truth val-
ues of its elementary subformulas: i.e., every truth assignment is T-functional
(which implies that the meaning of the logical connectives is independent of the
empirical interpretation of LO).
It is now important to observe that assumption O is coupled in CM with an
assumption of compatibility of properties, which can be stated as follows.
C. The measurement procedures associated with different properties can be
performed conjointly.
Assumption C implies indeed that the truth values of the complex sentences
of the kind considered above can be checked by checking the truth values of all
elementary sentences that occur in them and by using standard truth rules in
classical predicate logic. In particular, a sentence of the form S(a) can be seen
as logically equivalent to a conjunction of elementary sentences, each of which
states that a possesses a given property. Hence, also the truth value of S(a) can
be checked (or revealed) by means of measurements
2.3 The language of quantum mechanics
It is well known that QM has been considered a problematic theory since its
birth, and that many “interpretations” of it have been proposed. We avoid
dealing with this issue here, and refer only to the “standard interpretation”
(also “Copenhagen interpretation”) of QM, maintaining that QM deals with
individual examples of quantum physical systems (briefly, individual, or physical,
objects) and their properties (we remind that this option is classified as realistic
by some scholars; see, e.g., Busch et al., 1996).
When considering the language of the standard interpretation of QM and
comparing it with the language of CM, it is apparent that the basic notions
are similar, while their relations and interpretations are deeply different. To
be precise, the notions of state and property can be defined by replacing the
notions of material body and physical quantity with the notions of individual
object and observable, respectively, in the definitions introduced in the language
of CM. The mathematical apparatus of QM is obviously very different from the
mathematical apparatus of CM, but sentences as “the individual object a is in
the state S” or “the individual object a possesses the property E” still occur
in the language of QM and can be formalized by S(a) and E(a), respectively.
Hence classical connectives as ¬, ∧, ∨, etc., can be formally introduced to
construct complex sentences also in QM. Nevertheless, the semantic rules of
classical logic are not adequate to match the empirical domain that the language
of QM aims to describe. It is well known indeed that in Bohr’s holistic view
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(see, e.g., Bohr, 1958) or in Heisenberg’s distinction between “potential” and
“actual” properties (see, e.g., Heisenberg, 1958), assumption O in Section 2.2
(objectivity of properties) does not hold, as the outcome of any measurement
of a given property on a given individual object depends on the choice of the
(macroscopic) measurement procedure. This epistemological view, that has of
course an enormous impact on our conception of the physical world and has
given rise to a huge literature, is maintained to be “mathematically proven”
in QM because of several “no-go” theorems, the most important of which are
Bell’s (1964, 1966) and Kochen-Specker’s (1967). While we think that the proofs
of these theorems depend on some implicit epistemological assumptions that
may be questioned, thus opening the way to different interpretations of QM
(see Section 5), for the moment we maintain the standard view that QM is a
contextual theory (Bell, 1966; Kochen and Specker, 1967) and that contextuality
occurs also at a distance (nonlocality: Bell, 1964).
Contextuality and nonlocality have numerous puzzling consequences. We
aim to deal with the following in the present paper.
(i) We have seen in Section 2.1 that the intended interpretation of the the-
oretical language LT of a physical theory is not logically necessary but plays
a fundamental role in the intuitive comprehension of the theory. But contex-
tuality implies, in the case of QM, that it is impossible to supply an intended
interpretation (that is, a complete and direct physical model) of LT in which
individual objects are represented together with their properties. Thus, no in-
tuitive picture of the physical world can be given, which may explain why a
prominent physicist as Feynmann said “. . . I think I can safely say that no-
body understands quantum mechanics” (Feynmann, 1964). The famous duality
between particle and wave models for QM finds its roots in that impossibility.
(ii) When considering a composite quantum system, nonlocality implies that
measuring a property of a part of the system may instantaneously actualize a
property of another part, even if the latter is far away from the former. This
“spooky action at a distance”, as Einstein classified it, is commonly accepted
nowadays as a consequence of entanglement, but strongly clashes with our in-
tuitive conception of space and time (EPR paradox) even if it does not imply
any transmission of information.
(iii) The necessity of giving up assumption O in QM implies that truth val-
ues can be assigned to sentences of the form E(a) only by referring to specific
measurement procedures. But, then, it turns out that different measurement
procedures associated with the same property may yield different outcomes when
activated on a given individual object, and that the same measurement proce-
dure, when activated on different individual objects in the same state, may also
yield different outcomes. Moreover, it may occur that procedures associated
with different properties are incompatible, that is, they cannot be performed
conjointly, so that also assumption C in Section 2.2 does not hold in QM. It
follows that, even if a formal language with all elementary sentences of the
form S(a) and E(a) and connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, etc., is constructed, no classical
semantics can be defined on it in such a way that it formalizes a proper sublan-
guage of the language of QM. This remark has suggested the idea that a new,
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non-classical, notion of truth (quantum truth) is determined by QM, hence a
new logic, i.e. QL. The research on QL started indeed with a famous paper by
Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), which gave rise to an enormous literature,
and many scholars maintain that QL formalizes the basic language of QM (see,
e.g., Re´dei, 1958; Dalla Chiara et al., 2004).
(iv) Classical probability, whose mathematical structure is formalized by
Kolmogorov’s probability theory, be its “interpretation” logical, or frequentist,
or subjectivist, is usually maintained to be epistemic, i.e., to express our incom-
plete knowledge of the empirical world (hence of the truth values of the sentences
of the language that describes it). But an elementary sentence of the observa-
tional language of QM generally has no truth value before a measurement, hence
quantum probability cannot be considered as an (indirect) measure of our ig-
norance. Therefore it is often classified as ontic, and many scholars maintain
that it constitutes an intrinsic feature of the physical world. Moreover, quantum
probability is defined on the set of propositions of QL, which is an orthomodular
non-Boolean lattice, hence it does not satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms.
The above consequences of contextuality and nonlocality seem to establish
the incompatibility of the classical view of the physical world with the quantum
view. As anticipated in Section 1, however, a deeper analysis shows that the
classical view can be extended in different directions, which allows to establish
some unexpected connections with QL and quantum probability (Sections 3 and
4, respectively). Moreover, we intend to show that, at least in principle, a new
interpretation of QM recovering O cannot be excluded (Section 5).
3 Bridging classical and quantum logic
We have seen in Section 2.3 that some authors maintain that QM implicitly
determines a new notion of truth, hence a new logic (QL), which is incompatible
with CL. Other authors (see, e.g., Aerts, 1999) uphold instead that QL simply
formalizes empirical relations among properties in QM, not a new logic.
We have shown in several previous papers that an order structure isomorphic
to QL can be singled out inside CL (Garola, 2008; Garola and Sozzo, 2013),
and also that CL can be pragmatically extended in such a way that QL can
be seen as a part of that pragmatic extension (Garola, 2017). Both procedures
establish bridges between the two logics. The former allows a formal embedding
of QL into CL preserving a new order (physical preorder) that is implied by the
standard logical order but is generally weaker than it (it is well known instead
that no embedding of QL into CL preserving the algebraic structure is possible
because the algebraic structures of the two logics are different). The latter is
innovative and requires a generalization of the pragmatic language introduced by
ourselves together with another author several years ago to supply a pragmatic
interpretation of intuitionistic logic (Dalla Pozza and Garola, 1995). The two
procedures have different merits but can be interconnected by showing that
they are based on the same perspective. We resume both of them here focusing
mainly on their general features.
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3.1 Embedding quantum logic into classical logic
We will present our embedding by referring to our more recent paper on this
issue (Garola and Sozzo, 2013). The starting point is the construction of a
“concrete logic”, proceeding as follows.
(i) Let T be a physical theory in which the notions of physical object, prop-
erty and state are introduced. A classical formal language L(x) is constructed
that is intended to express basic relations in T (hence L(x) is a sublanguage of
the theoretical language of T ). The syntax of L(x) consists of two parts: firstly,
a logical vocabulary, or alphabet, which contains two disjoint sets of monadic
predicates (called the set E of properties and the set S of states, see Section
2.2), standard connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, an individual variable x and parenthe-
ses; secondly, standard formation rules, which define a set ψ(x) of elementary
and complex well-formed formulas (wffs). The (formal) semantics of L(x) con-
sists of a universe U of physical objects, a set Σ of interpretations of the variable
x, and, for every σ ∈ Σ, a truth assignment νσ that associates a truth value (t/f,
where t stands for true and f for false) with every wff of ψ(x), following classi-
cal truth rules. The logical preorder < and the logical equivalence ≡ are then
defined on ψ(x) in a standard way, i.e., by setting, for every α(x), β(x) ∈ ψ(x),
α(x) < β(x) iff, for every σ ∈ Σ, νσ(β(x)) = t whenever νσ(α(x)) = t, and
α(x) ≡ β(x) iff α(x) < β(x) and β(x) < α(x).
(ii) A subset φ(x) ⊂ ψ(x) is introduced whose elements are all wffs of ψ(x)
in which no symbol of state occurs. Based on the classical notion of truth, a
derived notion of C-truth is defined on φ(x) by stating that a wff α(x) ∈ φ(x)
is certainly true (certainly false) in a state S iff, for every σ ∈ Σ, νσ(S(x)) = t
implies νσ(α(x)) = t (νσ(α(x)) = f).
(iii) A physical preorder ≺ is defined on φ(x) by setting, for every α(x),
β(x) ∈ φ(x), α(x) ≺ β(x) iff, for every S ∈ S, α(x) certainly true in S implies
β(x) certainly true in S. Moreover, a physical equivalence ≈ is defined on φ(x)
by setting, for every α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x), α(x) ≈ β(x) iff α(x) ≺ β(x) and
β(x) ≺ α(x). Then, it can be proved that < implies ≺ and ≡ implies ≈.
(iv) A notion of verification is defined in L(x) by considering verifiable (ac-
cording to T ) all wffs of φ(x) that are logically equivalent to elementary wffs of
φ(x).
(v) Let φV (x) be the subset of all verifiable wffs of φ(x), and let T induce
a weak orthocomplementation ⊥ on (φV (x),≺) (i.e., a mapping of φV (x) into
itself such that, for every α(x) ∈ φV (x), (α(x))
⊥⊥ ≈ α(x), and for every α(x),
β(x) ∈ φV (x), α(x) ≺ β(x) implies (β(x))
⊥ ≺ (α(x))⊥). Then, the structure
(φV (x),≺,
⊥ ) is the concrete logic associated with T .
When considering CM, the phase space representation of physical systems
shows that C-truth coincides with classical truth on φ(x). Moreover, all wffs of
φ(x) are verifiable, at least in principle, according to CM, so that one can set
φV (x) = φ(x). Hence, the concrete logic of CM has the structure of a classical
logic. It is important to note, however, that there may be physical theories
of macroscopic systems in which the testability criteria are restricted, so that
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φV (x) is a proper subset of φ(x). In these cases, one obtains concrete logics
whose algebraic structure may be very different from the structure of Boolean
lattice that characterizes CL. Examples of these logics are provided (without
referring to L(x)) by the macroscopic systems considered by Aerts to show
that quantum logical structures can be obtained in suitably chosen macroscopic
domains (see, e.g., Aerts, 1999; Garola and Sozzo, 2013).
Aerts’ results are relevant because they falsify the belief that QL charac-
terizes QM, as they show that quantum structures can be obtained also in a
classical framework. We attain the same conclusion in a generalized form by
considering L(x). Indeed, the classical semantics introduced in L(x) implies
that L(x) cannot be seen as a sublanguage of the language of QM because of
the reasons expounded in Section 2.3. Nevertheless, one can show that, if φV (x)
satisfies suitably chosen axioms, then (φV (x),≺,
⊥ ) is a structure isomorphic to
QL (up to an equivalence relation). This conclusion implies that QL can be
embedded into CL and interpreted as a structure formalizing the properties of a
notion of true with certainty within φV (x) rather than the properties of a notion
of quantum truth, alternative to the classical notion of truth. This interpreta-
tion of QL is also supported by some traditional approaches to quantum physics,
as Piron’s (1976), in which the orthomodular structure of the set of quantum
“propositions” is recovered standing on the notion of true with certainty.
3.2 Recovering quantum logic within a pragmatic exten-
sion of classical logic
We have discussed with another author in a previous paper (Dalla Pozza and
Garola, 1995) how to pragmatically extend classical propositional logic in such a
way that intuitionistic propositional logic can be embedded into the pragmatic
part of the extension and reinterpreted as the logic formalizing the properties
of the metalinguistic notion of constructive logical proof. Such a reinterpreta-
tion has a deep philosophical meaning. Indeed, it shows that one can avoid
introducing an intuitionistic notion of truth, different and incompatible with
classical truth, by adopting the perspective of global pluralism, according to
which many different logical systems can coexist without being in competition,
for they formalize the properties of different metalinguistic notions (Haak, 1974,
1978; Garola, 1992).
Our pragmatic extension is based on a distinction that goes back to Frege
(1893) and that has given rise to a huge literature in linguistic and philosophical
studies: that is, the distinction between the sentences of a language, which can
be true or false, and the assertions of a speaker who commits himself to the
truth of the sentences he is uttering. Indeed, an assertion has not a truth value,
but it can only be justified (if a proof exists that the asserted sentence is true)
or unjustified (if no proof exists that the asserted sentence is true). Bearing in
mind this distinction, we firstly introduce a standard classical propositional logic
L, whose formulas we call radical formulas. Then we construct an extension LP
of L by adjoining a new category of logical-pragmatic signs, which contains an
assertion sign ⊢ and pragmatic connectives N , K, A, C and E, to the alphabet
10
of L. By using this extended vocabulary, new formation rules are introduced
which recursively define a set of elementary and complex assertive formulas of
LP . Every elementary assertive formula consists of a radical formula preceded
by the assertion sign, and every complex assertive formula consists of elementary
assertive formulas connected by pragmatic connectives. Then, pragmatic rules
are introduced which specify the conditions that must be fulfilled whenever
a pragmatic evaluation function on the set of all assertive formulas of LP is
given which assigns a justification value (justified/unjustified) to every assertive
formula. Such a value is defined in terms of an informal notion of proof, and
the assignment of a justification value to an assertive formula of LP depends on
the semantic assignment of truth values to the radical subformulas that occur
in it. Moreover, pragmatic evaluation functions are not J-functional, i.e., the
justification value of a complex assertive formula generally does not depend
only on the justification values of its elementary assertive subformulas because
of the features of the informal notion of proof that is adopted (which implies an
intuitionistic-like behaviour of the pragmatic connectives).
The language LP is original from several points of view: in particular, be-
cause of the introduction of pragmatic connectives and pragmatic evaluation
functions. It provides a pragmatic extension of classical propositional logic that
allows us to embed intuitionistic propositional logic in it, as we have just seen.
But it may have also a more general role: whenever the informal notion of
proof is suitably specified, it provides a framework in which non-classical logics
(and not only intuitionistic logic) can be embedded as fragments of its prag-
matic part. Hence it was natural for us to wonder, in particular, whether this
procedure could apply to QL.
The idea of recovering QL within LP , however, meets a serious difficulty from
the very beginning. Indeed, we have already seen in the previous sections that
the language of QM cannot bear a classical semantics. Hence a generalization of
the original language LP is needed to implement that idea. We introduce such
a generalization in the recent paper mentioned at the beginning of this section
(Garola, 2017), retaining the syntactic apparatus of LP and its pragmatic rules,
but assuming that the truth assignments on radical formulas can be partial, i.e.,
such that not all elementary and complex radical formulas have a truth value
(but classical truth rules for assigning truth values to complex radical formulas
are preserved, so that each truth assignment is T-functional in the sense specified
in Section 2.2). This generalization makes our pragmatic language (LPG in the
following) suitable for dealing not only with the standard interpretation of QM,
but also with other interpretations, as the modal interpretations or the objective
interpretation proposed by ourselves on the basis of our criticism of Bell’s and
Kochen-Specker’s theorems (see Section 5). Hence we can single out a fragment
LPGQ of L
P
G that we call quantum pragmatic language and introduce a physical
(intended) interpretation of it that specifies the notion of proof as the notion
of empirical proof in QM and supplies LPGQ with a semantics (which depends
on the interpretation of QM that has been chosen) and a pragmatics (which
does not depend on the choice of the interpretation of QM), in agreement with
the rules mentioned above. It is then easy to show that (ψAQ,≺), where ψAQ
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denotes the set of all assertive formulas of LPGQ and ≺ denotes the preorder
induced on ψAQ by the set of all pragmatic evaluation functions, is isomorphic
to QL, considered as an order structure, up to an equivalence relation. This
result implies that the connectives of QL can be identified, up to an equivalence
relation, with (primitive or derived) pragmatic connectives of LPGQ. Hence QL
can be interpreted as a structure formalizing the properties of the notion of
empirical justification in QM rather than of a notion of quantum truth.
The conclusion above matches the conclusion obtained in Section 3.1 if the
notion of verification is replaced by the equivalent notion of empirical justifi-
cation. Moreover, whenever the standard interpretation of QM is adopted, the
truth values (true/false) assigned to the radical formulas match the values of
C-truth assigned in Section 3.1 to the formulas of φ(x). But in Section 3.1 we
have seen that QL is proven to be isomorphic (up to an equivalence relation) to
an order structure embedded into a classical predicate logic. In the framework
presented in this section, instead, QL is embedded into a pragmatic extension
of a classical propositional logic, and the embedding is independent of the in-
terpretation of QM that is adopted. This makes the relation between QM and
CL more intuitive. The conclusion that QL does not characterize QM is instead
made more evident by the approach in Section 3.1. In both cases, however, a
bridge between the classical and the quantum views is thrown.
4 An epistemic interpretation of quantum prob-
ability
We have recalled in Section 2.3 that quantum probability is maintained to be
radically different from classical probability by many scholars. Indeed, besides
having a non-classical mathematical structure, it would not admit an epistemic
interpretation. This view, however, can be questioned. We have shown indeed in
a recent paper (Garola, 2018) that quantum probability can be recovered, under
reasonable assumptions that take into account contextuality, as a derived notion
in a classical probabilistic framework. This result throws another bridge between
the classical and the quantum views, and implies that quantum probability can
be considered epistemic, at variance with the standard view.
Our treatment in the paper mentioned above starts from a simple remark.
The basic language of QM considered in Section 2.3, which is strongly influenced
by the language of CM, makes no reference to contextuality, which is introduced
as a complex theoretical notion that can be expressed only by a higher order
language. But contextuality is a fundamental feature of QM, which suggests
that it should enter its language from the very beginning as an essential notion
associated with the notion of property. Moreover, one can suspect that such
a change in the basic language of QM could make it possible to introduce a
classical semantics on it, avoiding the problems mentioned in Section 2.3.
A hint on how to implement the above suggestions is given by our comments
on the language of QM in Section 2.3. We can indeed retain all elementary
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sentences of the form “the individual object a is in the state S”, formalized by
S(a), and replace every elementary sentence of the form “the individual object
a possesses the property E” with the sentence “the individual object a possesses
the property E in the context C” or, briefly, “the individual object a possesses
the contextual property EC”. A sentence of this kind could then be formalized
by EC(a) in the new basic language of QM.
Of course, the proposal above requires specifying an empirical interpreta-
tion of the context C. At first sight, one could think of C as the macroscopic
measurement context determined by a measurement procedure associated with
a property E. But it is well known that QM predicts that performing a given
measurement on different individual objects in the same state may yield differ-
ent outcomes. This can be intuitively explained by adopting a picture of the
world according to which a microscopic world underlies the macroscopic world
of our everyday experience and by noticing that there are two possible sources
of randomness for the outcomes of a measurement, as follows.
(i) When an individual object is prepared by activating a preparation proce-
dure associated with a state S (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3), we control only macro-
scopic variables, not the physical situation at a microscopic level. Thus different
individual objects produced by the preparation procedure are not bound to pos-
sess the same contextual properties.
(ii) When performing a measurement, many microscopic contexts (which
can be described, in principle, by QM itself) can be associated with the (macro-
scopic) measurement procedure that is activated, and different microscopic con-
texts that we cannot control may affect in different ways the outcome of the
measurement.
Remark (ii) suggests that C should denote a microscopic context if we want
to assign a truth value to a sentence of the form EC(a). Bearing in mind this
suggestion, our first step in the paper mentioned above is constructing a new
language intended to serve as a basic elementary language for theories belonging
to a class T of theories in which the notions of physical (or individual) object,
state, property and context play a fundamental role. This language is conceived
as an extension of the language L(x) considered in Section 3.1, hence it will still
be called L(x) by abuse of language.
The syntax of L(x) consists of two parts, i.e. an alphabet and standard
formation rules. The former contains two disjoint sets S and EC of monadic
predicates, with S a set of states and EC = {EC = (E,C)|E ∈ E , C ∈ C} a set
of contextual properties that is the Cartesian product of a set E of properties,
each of which is associated with a setME of measurement procedures, and a set
C of microscopic contexts (briefly, µ-contexts). Moreover, the alphabet of L(x)
contains standard connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, an individual variable x and parentheses.
The formation rules then define in a standard way the set Ψ(x) of elementary
and complex well-formed formulas (wffs) of L(x).
The (formal) semantics of L(x) consists of a universe U of individual ob-
jects, a set Σ of interpretations of the variable x, and for every σ ∈ Σ, a truth
assignment νσ that associates a truth value (t/f , where t stands for true and
f for false) with every wff of Ψ(x) following classical truth rules (to be pre-
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cise, an extension ext(α(x)) ⊂ U of individual objects is associated with every
α(x) ∈ Ψ(x) in such a way that the set of all extensions, ordered by set inclusion,
is a Boolean lattice, and, for every σ ∈ Σ, νσ(α(x)) = t iff σ(x) ∈ ext(α(x))).
Finally, the logical preorder < and the logical equivalence ≡ are defined on Ψ(x)
in a standard way.
It is now important to observe that the truth assignments on Ψ(x) are the-
oretical functions whose values generally cannot be checked by means of mea-
surements. Indeed, we cannot control the µ-context underlying a measurement,
hence we cannot select a measurement whose outcome yields the truth value of
an elementary wff EC(x) when an interpretation σ of the variable x is given.
Moreover, several different contextual properties may occur in a complex wff
α(x) ∈ Ψ(x) which refer to different µ-contexts. Hence different measurement
procedures may be required to check the truth value of α(x), which raises the
problem of their compatibility.
Our second step in (Garola, 2018) is suggested by remark (i). We construct
indeed a µ-contextual probability structure on L(x) by firstly introducing a prob-
ability measure on the Boolean lattice of all extensions and then defining, for
every pair (α(x), β(x)) ∈ Ψ(x) × Ψ+(x) (where Ψ+(x) is the subset of all wffs
of Ψ(x) whose extension has a non-zero probability measure), a µ-contextual
conditional probability p(α(x)|β(x)) ∈ [0, 1] of α(x) given β(x). Such a struc-
ture is basically classical, hence µ-contextual conditional probabilities admit an
epistemic interpretation. In other words, they can be considered as indexes of
our lack of knowledge of the (classical) truth assignments on Ψ(x). However,
these probabilities, as the truth assignments considered above, generally cannot
be checked by means of measurements. Indeed, checking a µ-contextual con-
ditional probability would require performing the same measurement on many
individual objects, maintaining under control both the preparation procedures
at a microscopic level and the µ-contexts underlying the measurement, which is
impossible, as noticed in remarks (i) and (ii).
Our third step in (Garola, 2018) is then looking for theoretical entities,
empirically interpreted via correspondence rules (see Section 2.1), whose values
can be checked. To this end we consider, for every property E, the set ME
of all measurement procedures associated with E, and, for every M ∈ ME ,
the macroscopic measurement context CM determined by M and the set CM
of all µ–contexts underlying CM . Then, we associate a probability to each µ-
context C ∈ CM . This framework allows us to introduce a binary relation k of
compatibility on the set E of all properties (the propertiesE and F are compatible
or, briefly, EkF , iff they share at least one measurement procedure; hence k is
reflexive, symmetric, but generally not transitive). Moreover, it allows us to
select a subset of testable wffs of Ψ(x)(a wff α(x) is testable iff all properties
that occur in it are compatible and associated with the same µ–context or,
conventionally, iff no contextual property occurs in it, as in the case of the
elementary wff S(x)) and to introduce a notion of joint testability on Ψ(x)
(the wffs α(x) and β(x) are jointly testable iff their conjunction is testable).
Whenever α(x) and β(x) are jointly testable, they share some measurement
procedures. Choosing one of them, sayM , and assuming that, for every C ∈ CM ,
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β(x) ∈ Ψ+(x) (which will be understood in the following), we introduce the
average of the µ-contextual conditional probability of α(x) given β(x) over all
the µ-contexts in CM . Whenever this average does not depend on the choice of
M , we denote it by < p(α(x)|β(x)) > and say that it is the mean conditional
probability of α(x) given β(x).
Mean conditional probability is crucial in our approach. Indeed, we can now
focus our attention on the subclass T′ ⊂ T of theories in which, for every pair
(α(x), β(x)) ∈ Ψ(x)×Ψ+(x) of jointly testable wffs, the foregoing condition on
the average is fulfilled and a mean conditional probability of α(x) given β(x)) is
defined. Then, in every T ∈ T′, we can assume that performing a measurement
by activating a measurement procedure M shared by α(x) and β(x) on a large
number of individual objects tells us the truth values of α(x) and β(x) for
different interpretations of the variable x, which allows us to evaluate frequencies
that we assume to check the mean conditional probability < p(α(x)|β(x)) >.
Intuitively, this assumption can be justified by observing that both sources of
randomness pointed out in remarks (i) and (ii) underlie M . We therefore call
the foregoing repeated activation of M on different individual objects a mean
probability measurement.
Our general framework is thus completed. Its relevance and usefulness be-
come apparent when considering special cases. Bearing in mind the role of
properties and states in QM, let us consider, in particular, the elementary wffs
EC(x) and S(x). Both these wffs are testable (the latter by convention, as
stated above). Moreover, they are obviously jointly testable, and we can assume
that S(x) ∈ Ψ+(x) (the state S would be irrelevant if ext(S(x)) had probabil-
ity measure zero). Thus, for every E ∈ E and S ∈ S, we can consider the
mean conditional probability < p(EC(x)|S(x)) > of EC(x) given S(x), which
we briefly denote by PS(E) in the following. Hence, we can define a preorder ≺
and an equivalence relation ≈ on the set E of all properties (for every E, F ∈ E ,
E ≺ F iff, for every S ∈ S, PS(E) < PS(F ), and E ≈ F iff E ≺ F and F ≺ E).
Whenever (E ,≺) is a lattice with an orthocomplementation ⊥ (i.e., a mapping
of E into itself such that, for every E ∈ E , E⊥⊥ = E, and for every E, F ∈ E ,
E ≺ F iff F⊥ ≺ E⊥) and the mapping PS : E ∈ E → PS(E) ∈ [0, 1] satisfies
some standard conditions (in particular, the probability of the join of disjoint
properties is the sum of the probabilities of the properties), we say that PS is
a generalized probability measure on (E ,≺,⊥ ) and call PS(E) the Q-probability
of E given S. If (E ,≺,⊥ ) is not Boolean, then PS is a non-classical probability
measure, hence we conclude that non-classical probabilities can be obtained as
derived notions in our classical probabilistic framework. It is then easy to show
that PS , if it is non-classical, does not allow to define in a canonical way a
conditional Q-probability of a property E given S and another property F . We
are thus led to introduce a non-standard definition of conditional Q-probability
by considering successive measurements of E and F (we avoid details here for
the sake of brevity).
Let us come to QM. If we assume that QM belongs to the class T′ of theories
defined above, we obtain some important achievements.
First of all, the quantum probability of a property E in a state S (Born’s
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rule) can be considered as the specific form that the Q-probability PS(E) takes
in QM. Hence we conclude that the non-classical character of quantum proba-
bility can be explained in classical terms by taking into account µ-contexts. In
particular, quantum probability can be seen as a derived notion in a classical
probabilistic framework, hence it can be given an epistemic rather than an on-
tic interpretation. To be precise, it can be interpreted as an (indirect) measure
of our lack of knowledge of the physical situation at a microscopic level, both
referring to preparation and to measurement procedures.
Secondly, the reflexive, symmetric but not transitive binary relation of com-
patibility on E introduced in QM can be seen as the specific form that the
relation k takes in QM, which provides a natural explanation of it in a contex-
tual framework.
Thirdly, the quantum notion of conditional probability can be considered
as the specific form that the conditional Q-probability takes in QM, so that
its non-standard features (in particular, the violation of the Bayes theorem) is
explained in terms of contextuality.
We add that our perspective is supported by some previous research in the
literature. Indeed, mean conditional probabilities and mean probability mea-
surements are conceptually similar to the universal averages and the universal
measurements, respectively, introduced by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi (2014,
2017). Our recognition that two sources of randomness underlie each measure-
ment procedure also agrees with analogous remarks of these authors.
To close, we note that we showed in (Garola, 2018) that CM can be included
in the class T′ as a special theory, in which truth assignments on Ψ(x) do not
depend on the µ-contexts and the compatibility relation k is trivial.
5 The contextuality of quantum mechanics: a
critical view
We have shown in the previous sections that some bridges can be thrown be-
tween the classical and the quantum views even if the standard interpretation
of QM is adopted. In particular, we have explicitly accepted in Section 4 the
standard view according to which QM is a contextual theory. This view rests
nowadays on the theorems quoted in Section 2.3, which are maintained to prove
that assumption O in Section 2.3 is untenable in QM, hence to provide an ir-
refutable support to the thesis, going back to the founders of the theory, that the
properties of a quantum physical system are only potential before a measure-
ment (or non-objective, according to the terminology adopted in this paper).
However, the conclusion above may be questioned. Indeed, we have shown
in some previous papers (see, e.g., Garola and Sozzo, 2010; Garola and Persano,
2014) that the aforesaid theorems rest on a hidden epistemological assumption.
If such assumption is accepted, then the standard view follows at once, but if it is
rejected, then new interpretations of QM become possible, at least in principle,
which avoid contextuality, hence the non-objectivity of properties. We supply
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in this section a brief account of this issue. The reader can find more complete
treatment and bibliography in the papers quoted above.
Let us consider Bell’s (1966) and Kochen-Specker’s (1967) theorems. These
theorems aim to show that (local) hidden variables that would determine the
values of all observables of a quantum physical system independently of any
measurement cannot exist (which amounts to say, from our present point of
view, that assumption O in Section 3.2 is untenable when dealing with quantum
physical systems), and many different proofs of them besides the original ones
have been provided. But an analysis of such proofs shows that they rest, as
stated above, on an epistemological assumption that is usually left implicit. To
make the point clear, let us consider a typical scheme of proof of contextuality
(see also Greenberger et al., 1990; Mermin, 1993).
(i) A theoretical law Λ of QM is considered (e.g., the conservation of total
angular momentum in the case of a spin 1 particle).
(ii) Some laws Λ1, Λ2, . . . are deduced from Λ, each of which contains only
compatible observables and establishes correlations among the possible values
of the observables that occur in it (via a Kochen-Specker condition that we do
not report here for the sake of brevity). But the choice of Λ1, Λ2, . . . is done
in such a way that there are observables in some laws that are not compatible
with observables that occur in other laws.
(iii) It is assumed (ad absurdum) that the values of the observables are
independent of the measurements that one can perform to check (the predictions
of) Λ1, Λ2, . . . .
(iv) It is shown that, if Λ1, Λ2, . . . are suitably chosen, every assignment
of values to all observables that occur in Λ1, Λ2, . . . contradicts some of the
correlations among possible values established by these laws.
(v) The contradiction in (iv) follows from the assumption in (iii), which is
therefore untenable (hence the contextuality of QM).
Based on the conclusion in (v), the accepted doctrine states that, whenever
we perform a measurement intended to check one of the laws Λ1, Λ2, . . . , say Λi,
we determine a context that actualizes some possible values of the (compatible)
observables that occur in Λi. These values are correlated in such a way that
Λi is satisfied. But if we check another law, say Λj, in which an observable
A occurs that also occurs in Λi, the measurement context associated with Λj
may actualize a value of A that is different from the value actualized by the
measurement checking Λi.
To analyse critically the arguments above, let us refer to the received view
summarized in Section 2.1. According to this view, the laws Λ1, Λ2, . . . can
be considered as statements of the theoretical language of QM, but Λ1, Λ2, . . .
correspond, via the correspondence rules, to laws expressed by statements of the
observational language of QM, which we still denote by Λ1, Λ2, . . . by abuse of
language (hence Λ1, Λ2, . . . will be considered both as elements of the theoretical
and of the observational language). These laws are empirical laws, in the sense
that each of them can be checked by means of measurements that establish the
values of the observables that occur in it. Every set of measurements checking
the law Λi determines a (macroscopic) measurement context. Thus we can
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associate with Λi a set of measurement contexts (there are generally many
ways of checking Λi), and QM implies that Λi is a true sentence in each of
these measurement contexts, so that the correlations among the values of the
observables established by Λi (see (ii) above) must be fulfilled by the outcomes of
the measurements when Λi is checked. But the formalism of QM does not imply
by itself that Λi is true in those physical contexts in which it cannot be checked
(e.g., in a measurement context associated with a law Λj 6= Λi). Stating that Λi
is true in every physical context is a metalinguistic (epistemological) assumption
on the laws of QM (assumption R in the following) that can be added to the
mathematical formulation of QM but is not implied by it.
Now, reaching the conclusion in (v) requires just introducing assumption R
besides QM. Indeed, one needs to assume that Λ1, Λ2, . . . are true in every
physical context to establish that one cannot accept the contradiction in (iv)
and must give up the assumption in (iii). Equivalently, one needs to assume
that the conjunction of Λ1, Λ2, . . . must be always true, even if no measurement
context can be associated with it because non-compatible observables occur in
it. The introduction of assumption R in the reasoning above, however, usually
remains implicit, and most scholars are not aware of it, so that contextuality is
maintained to be a mere mathematical consequence of the formalism of QM.
Of course, introducing assumption R is not wrong, and no criticism can be
done in this sense to the standard view. But it must be considered as an (episte-
mological) choice, not a logical necessity. Moreover, it should be noted that this
choice is consistent with a classical realistic conception of theoretical laws, even
if its consequences are highly non-classical when dealing with quantum physical
systems, because it implies abandoning every attempt at introducing a classical
semantics in the language of QM.
One is thus led to inquire the alternative nonstandard choice of dispensing
with assumption R. One then concludes that, whenever this choice is made,
the conjunction of Λ1, Λ2, . . . , if considered as a sentence of the observational
language, is not bound to be always true. It joins indeed the empirical laws Λ1,
Λ2, . . . , each of which is true in its measurement contexts but may be false in
physical contexts in which it cannot be checked. All predictions of QM are thus
preserved, but the contradiction in (iv) does not imply that the assumption in
(iii) must be rejected. Hence the possibility of adopting a classical semantics
for the language of QM avoiding contextuality cannot be excluded.
The above arguments suggest a generalization. Indeed, assumption R can
be seen as a special case of a general principle (which we called meta-theoretical
classical principle, or MCP, in some previous papers, see, e.g., Garola and Per-
sano, 2014) that states that all physical laws expressed as sentences of the ob-
servational language of a physical theory must be true in every physical context.
Then we call accepting MCP standard epistemological position in the following.
Dispensing with R suggests instead a new general principle (which we called
meta-theoretical generalized principle, or MGP, see again Garola and Persano,
2014) that states that all physical laws expressed as sentences of the obser-
vational language of a physical theory are bound to be true in every physical
context in which they can be checked, but can be true as well as false in those
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physical contexts in which they cannot be checked. Then, we call accepting
MGP nonstandard epistemological position in the following. This position is
consistent with interpreting the mathematical apparatus of QM as a calculus
whose role is producing laws of the observational language by deduction and by
using the correspondence rules. Whenever one of these laws relates only com-
patible observables, some measurement contexts exist in which the law is bound
to be true (i.e., the assignments of values to the observables that occur in it are
bound to satisfy the law itself) and in these contexts it can be checked. But
if the law relates incompatible observables, then it cannot be checked in any
physical context, and no measurement context exists in which the law is bound
to be true (i.e., the assignments of values to the observables that occur in it are
not bound to satisfy the law itself). Any realistic conception of the theoretical
laws of QM must thus be excluded, which makes the foregoing nonstandard
epistemological position more consistent with the “anti-metaphysical” attitude
of QM than the standard epistemological position.
Summing up, the standard view adopts a standard epistemological position,
hence accepts a widespread conception of the laws of physics, but is then pre-
vented from introducing a classical semantics for the language of QM because
of the non-objectivity of properties following from contextuality. An alternative
view adopting the nonstandard epistemological position (which, even if non-
standard, is consistent with the received view, see Section 2.1) does not meet
with a similar prohibition, which opens the way to alternative interpretations
of QM that avoid non-objectivity of properties, thus allowing the introduction
of a classical semantics for the language of QM. A new bridge is thus thrown
between the classical and the quantum views of the world.
Both the standard and the nonstandard epistemological positions meet, how-
ever, some problems. The former implies, in particular, contextuality at a dis-
tance, or nonlocality, which is counterintuitive. The latter may avoid this kind
of contextuality but implies a kind of contextuality of empirical physical laws
that can be seen as a consequence of the limits of our theoretical knowledge but
is somewhat uneasy. However, the nonstandard epistemological position has the
merit of leaving open the possibility of finding a more general theoretical frame-
work, embedding QM, in which properties are objective. In this framework QM
would be regarded as an incomplete theory, recovering a perspective going back
to Einstein (1935).
To close, we remind that we have tried in several papers to take some steps
towards the construction of the theoretical framework envisaged above (see, e.g.,
Garola, 2015; Garola et al., 2016). Our proposal (which we called ESR model)
assumes that any property that a microscopic physical system may possess is
either possessed or not possessed by the system (here called physical object,
as in the previous sections) independently of any measurement, and tries to
explain the laws of QM in terms of more general laws. The basic idea consists
in assigning a probability that a physical object may remain undetected when
a measurement on it is performed because of the set of properties possessed
by the physical object itself rather than because of a lack of efficiency of the
measurements. The quantum probability that a physical object in a state S
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turns out to possess the property E when a measurement of E is performed on
it would then refer to the set of physical objects that can be detected in this
kind of measurement rather than to the set of physical objects that are prepared
in the state S. Thus, our ESR model modifies the standard interpretation of
quantum probabilities but preserves the mathematical apparatus of QM, which
is embedded into a more general mathematical framework. Moreover, the ESR
model predicts that there are upper limits (depending on the measurements
that are considered) to the percentage of objects that can be detected, which
makes it falsifiable.
Acknowledgement. The author is greatly indebted with Dr. Antonio
Negro for carefully reading the manuscript and providing many useful remarks
and suggestions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aerts, D. (1999). Foundations of quantum physics: a general realistic and
operational approach. Int. J. Theor. Phys. 38, 289-358.
Aerts, D. and Sassoli de Bianchi, M. (2014). The extended Bloch repre-
sentation of quantum mechanics and the hidden-measurement solution of the
measurement problem. Ann. Phys. 351, 975-1025.
Aerts, D. and Sassoli de Bianchi, M. (2017). Universal Measurements. How
to Free Three Birds in One Move. World Scientific, Singapore.
Bell, J.S. (1964). On the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen Paradox. Physics 1, 195–
200.
Bell, J.S. (1966). On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechan-
ics. Rev. Mod. Phys. 38, 447–452.
Birkhoff, G. and von Neumann, J. (1936). The Logic of Quantum Mechanics.
Ann. Math. 37, 823–843.
Bohr, N. (1958). Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. John Wiley and
Sons, London.
Braithwaite, R.B. (1953). Scientific Explanation. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Busch, P., Lahti, P.J. and Mittelstaedt, P. (1996). The Quantum Theory of
Measurement. Springer, Berlin.
Carnap, R. (1966). Philosophical Foundations of Physics. Basic Books Inc.,
New York.
Dalla Chiara, M. L., Giuntini, R. and Greechie, R. (2004). Reasoning in
Quantum Theory. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Dalla Pozza, C. and Garola, C. (1995). A pragmatic interpretation of intu-
itionistic propositional logic. Erkenntnis 43, 81-109.
Einstein, A., Podolski, B. and Rosen, N. (1935). Can quantum mechanical
description of physical reality be considered complete? Phys. Rev. 47, 777-780.
Feyerabend, F. (1975). Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of
Knowledge. New Left Books, London.
Feynmann, R.P. (1964). The Messenger Lecture Series at Cornell, Lecture
6. In The Character of Physical Laws. The MIT Press, 1967/1917.
20
Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I, Pohle, Jena.
Garola, C. (1992). Truth versus testability in quantum logic. Erkenntnis
37, 197-222.
Garola, C. (2008). Physical propositions and quantum languages. Int. J.
Theor. Phys. 47, 90-103.
Garola, C. (2015). A survey of the ESR model for an objective interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Int. J. Theor. Phys. 54, 4410-4422.
Garola, C. (2017). Interpreting quantum logic as a pragmatic structure, Int.
J. Theor. Phys. 56, 3770-3782.
Garola, C. (2018). An epistemic interpretation of quantum probability via
contextuality. Found. Sci., DOI: 10.1007/s10699-018-9560-4.
Garola, C. and Persano, M. (2014). Embedding quantum mechanics into a
broader noncontextual theory. Found. Sci. 19, 217-239.
Garola, C. and Sozzo, S. (2010). Realistic aspects in the standard interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics. Humana.ment. J. Phil. Stud. 13, 81-101.
Garola, C. and Sozzo, S. (2013). Recovering quantum logic within an ex-
tended classical framework. Erkenntnis 78, 399-314.
Garola, C., Sozzo, S. and Wu, J. (2016). Outline of a generalization and a
reinterpretation of quantum mechanics recovering objectivity. Int. J. Theor.
Phys. 55, 2500-2528.
Greenberger, D.M., Horne, M.A., Shimony, A. and Zeilinger, A. (1990).
Bell’s theorem without inequalities. Am. J. Phys. 58, 1131-1143.
Haack, S. (1974). Deviant Logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Haack, S. (1978). Philosophy of Logic. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Heisenberg, W. (1958). Physics and Philosophy: the Revolution of Modern
Science. Harper, New York.
Hempel, C.C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation. Free Press, New
York.
Kochen, S. and Specker, E. P. (1967). The Problem of Hidden Variables in
Quantum Mechanics. J. Math. Mech. 17, 59–87.
Kuhn, T.S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago Univer-
sity Press, Chicago.
Mermin, N.D. (1993). Hidden variables and the two theorems of John Bell.
Rev. Mod. Phys. 65, 803-815.
Nagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science. Harcourt, Brace & World, New
York.
Piron, C. (1976). Foundations of Quantum Physics. Benjamin, Reading
(MA).
Re´dei, N. (1998). Quantum Logic in Algebraic Approach. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Schlosshauer, M., Kofler, J., Zeilinger, A. (2013). A snapshot of foundational
attitudes toward quantum mechanics. Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 44 (3),
222-230.
Tarski, A. (1944). The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of
semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, 341-375.
21
Tarski, A. (1956). The concept of truth in formalized languages. In J.M.
Woodger (Ed.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (pp. 152-268). Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
22
